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THE GRAMMARS OF MODERN IDENTITY
Benedict R. Anderson
Als die Tiger trinkend sich im Wasser erblicken,
werden sie oft gefährlich.
When tigers see themselves in the water they drink,
they often become dangerous.
—Bertolt Brecht
I. Preliminaries
On February 29, 1920, in the small township of Delanggu, Cen-
tral Java, close to the heart of the fabulously productive sugar
belt of the colonial Netherlands East Indies, something quite
without local precedent took place: an open-air political rally.
Among the fiery speakers who addressed the surely bewildered
but excited assembly of peasants in sarongs and sugar-central
workers in baggy shorts, none must have been more strangely
striking than the man known as Haji Misbach. For his title
showed that he was a pious returned pilgrim from Mecca, but
on this day he spoke also as a committed Communist. And his
dark brown face was positioned between a gleaming white pith
helmet and an elegantly tailored colonial-style high-necked
white jacket. What he said was no less extraordinary:
The present age can rightly be called the djaman balik boeono [an
ancient Javanese folk-expression meaning “age-of-the-world-
turned-upside-down,” or chaos] — for what used to be above is
now certainly under. It is said that in the country of Oostenrijk
[Dutch for “Austria”], which used to be headed by a radja [Malay
for “monarch”], there has now been a balik boeono. It is now
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headed by a Republic, and many ambtenaar [Dutch for “govern-
ment official”] have been killed by the Republic. A former ambte-
naar has only to show his nose for his throat to be cut. So,
brothers, remember! The land belongs to no one other than our-
selves.1
Misbach’s account was quite correct, if, alas, three months
late. Charles VII had abdicated the Austro-Hungarian throne in
November 1918. Revolutionary upsurges had occurred in
Vienna and Budapest. Béla Kun’s Hungarian Communist Party
had seized power on March 21, 1919, and in the four months
before this regime collapsed in face of Czech and Romanian
invasions, it did execute a good number of class-enemies. But by
November 25, the Allies had helped put Miklós Horthy in
power, and he proceeded to launch a white terror of his own.
Correct, but then astonishing. For he spoke to his illiterate
audience with the fullest confidence in the existence of a country
he called “Oostenrijk” — for which neither Javanese nor Malay
had yet a name, and which he had never seen with his own eyes
— on the other side of the “world.” Furthermore, he described
revolutionary events in Europe as if they were coordinated with
events in Java—within a single global frame of time, so to speak:
the age-of-the-world-turned-upside-down. This absolutely real,
imagined coordination allowed him to predict that the fate that
had befallen radja and ambtenaar in Oostenrijk would immi-
nently strike their counterparts in the Netherlands Indies. What
made this coordination conceivable was Misbach’s use of the 
little word “a.” “A” radja, “a” balik boeono, “a” Republic, “a” for-
mer ambtenaar — in each case the article “a” showed his imagin-
ing of global category-series that indifferently spanned visible
Java and invisible Oostenrijk. That Misbach could use three dif-
ferent languages, including colonial Dutch, to indicate these
series also indicated something then very new: that languages
are transparent to one another, interpenetrate one another, and
map one another’s domains — at an equal remove from the
material world. For this equality to become possible, Dutch had
to descend from its status as the language of colonial domina-
tion, and Javanese from its position as the language of ancestral
truth. A last crucial, half-invisible novelty was the matter-
of-factly new way in which Misbach used the word boeono. 
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Its ancient meaning was something close to “cosmos” — a nat-
ural, vertical universe encompassing everything from the Deity
(or deities), kings, aristocrats, peasants, fauna, and flora to the
landscapes in which they were embedded. It was in this sense
that petty Javanese rulers of the day could still call themselves
Paku Buwono (Nail of the Cosmos), i.e., pivots of a natural cosmic
order. But Misbach, gleefully anticipating a series of overturn-
ings of boeono, clearly meant by it “world” in the novel sense of a
horizontal universe of visible and invisible, utterly comparable
human beings from which demons, water buffalo, volcanoes,
and angels had disappeared.
What made Misbach and his speech possible and, at the same
time, makes him such a familiar figure to us today? (Misbach’s
father, in his youth, would have found his speech incomprehen-
sible.) The answer, I think, is that he spoke in the modern gram-
mar of seriality, by which almost everything stands under the
sign of “a,” that is, as fundamentally representative rather than
sui generis.2 And what taught him to think in this manner were
the institutions of mass urban culture that industrial capitalism
and the technologies of mechanical reproduction were bringing
to the colony from the 1890s onward.
The central institution, for our purposes here, was, and is, the
newspaper. From its earliest days in Europe and the Americas,
newspapermen — without thinking much about it — attempted
to bring Misbach’s “world” to their local readers by means of
the locally dominant vernacular. Newspapers might give far
greater coverage to events taking place within the political state
where they were produced, but their reach always went much
further.3 Over time, as the means of communication were per-
fected and accelerated, this “world coverage,” no matter how
distorted in practice, became ever more normalized. No one in
Rangoon is surprised to see European Football Cup results in
his Burmese newspaper; Korean newspapers find it perfectly
natural to report on atrocities in Rwanda; and so on. Every-
where, quite unselfconsciously, “this world of mankind” is
taken for granted. But — and this is perhaps even more impor-
tant — the paradoxical situation of local, vernacular presses
reporting on the whole world, thus far beyond the real territorial
domain encompassing particular readerships, necessitated a
profound homogenization, standardization, and, indeed, serial-
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ization of vocabularies. No matter how vast the concrete differ-
ences in languages, beliefs, economies, and social relations
between the “subjects” of newspapers’ reportage, their funda-
mental grammar overrides almost all such differences. Haile
Selassie and Hirohito are serialized as empéreurs; Caracas and
Hanoi as “capital cities”; de Gaulle and Nyerere as nationalistes,
Plantagenet England and eighteenth-century Siam as sakdina
social orders4 — and, of course, Oostenrijk and Java as sites of
balik boeono. In effect, the newspapers were and are producing,
quite unselfconsciously, what I would call “quotidian univer-
sals,” ceaselessly and seamlessly mapping a singular world.
This is why we always find our own newspapers, no matter
how irritating their bias, perfectly comprehensible even when
they speak of remote places of which we know next to nothing.
Furthermore, one should not forget another critical peculiarity
of the newspaper, namely that dozens of unconnected develop-
ments in different parts of the boeono appear juxtaposed in the
same pages of a particular daily issue: that is, they are bathed in
a shared (serial) Time.
Something quite similar has been taking place in the domain
of the image, and for connected reasons. Let me draw again on
turn-of-the-century colonial Java for a vivid illustration of the
transformation I have in mind. Up until the end of the last cen-
tury, all popular indigenous performances (shadow-puppet the-
ater, dance drama, masked dance, and so on) were grounded in
a logic that was profoundly iconographic. The stories were
invariably drawn from local legends or from episodes in the
Mahabharata and Ramayana epics, which over the centuries
had become so indigenized that only a tiny minority of the pop-
ulation was aware of their Indic provenance. Not only were the
stories familiar to audiences, but so were their characters, which
were differentiated by strictly defined rules: body types, coif-
fures, speech styles, makeup, costumes, gestures, and so on.
There was, so to speak, only one Shiva or Rama, who was
instantly recognized the minute he appeared on stage — by his
modulated singularity. (We recognize this type of representa-
tion in Western traditional conventions about what Jesus Christ,
the Virgin Mary, Saint Sebastian, and Satan must look like.) In
this kind of drama there was no question of consciously inter-
preting the characters, and it was often thought unimportant
Macalester International Vol. 4
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that a female character was performed by a male actor (and
sometimes vice versa). Scripts were unheard of because the tra-
ditional rules for how each character could speak were rigid,
leaving easy improvisation the normal order of the day.
But at the end of the century, a new type of theater, partly
stimulated by the examples set by traveling European and
Eurasian operetta and vaudeville troupes, crystallized in the
newspaper towns of the colony. What happened when — as in
fact did happen — indigenous troupes decided to perform their
own vernacular versions of The Merchant of Venice or La Traviata?
Neither Venice nor Paris was known to traditional drama, and
they came to audiences of 1900, if at all, through newspapers,
magazines, and atlases, within the series “strange places on the
world map.” More significant, the characters in such dramas —
precisely because they were interestingly new — could not be
presented iconographically. Take Shylock, for example. How
was he to be presented?5 No Jews had ever figured in traditional
drama—no moneylenders either. Marguerite? No tuberculars or
loving prostitutes had ever appeared on the older stages. The
actor (now his or her gender began to matter) could no longer
improvise, but required the help of script and rehearsal to “cre-
ate” Shylock and Marguerite, i.e., to give them social verisimili-
tude: this meant situating them at the intersections of such
universal series as cruel moneylenders, prostitutes, doting
fathers, tubercular women, obsessive misers, and so forth.
The fact that these troupes were trying to make a living out of
the new and the serial required that they do their best to adver-
tise themselves in advance, and repertory prospectuses thus
began to appear in local newspapers. The form of these adver-
tisements — “Buy Tickets to See a Beautiful, Tubercular, French,
Tender-Hearted Prostitute” — showed their strict grammatical
alignment with serial capital cities, football matches, industrial
strikes, and elections but also with the burgeoning world of
advertised mass-produced commodities (Come, See, and Buy a
Raleigh Bicycle—or, indeed, Misbach’s white topee).
It was this revolutionized grounding that prepared the way
for the rise of the commercial cinema in Haji Misbach’s lifetime,
and, of course, television in that of his children and grandchil-
dren. These media work, in the manner of the newspaper, on the
principle of seriality and thus travel pretty well — gangsters in
Benedict R. Anderson
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Tokyo and Brazil, bored teenagers in Jakarta and Chicago, lov-
ing mothers in Mexico City and Accra. Nothing shows this fun-
damental feature more than the complete calm with which
dubbing is everywhere received. Thai couch-potatoes watch
without any sense of discomfort J. R. and Dr. Huxtable speaking
in Thai. After all, they belong comfortably in global worldwide
series (crooked millionaires and goodhearted doctors) that
stretch out and away from Bangkok.
Needless to say, the serialization of the imagination was not
generated out of thin air by the rising mass media, but
depended ultimately on the uneven global spread of the mater-
ial, technological, and institutional foundations of industrial
society — the most basic of which are perhaps man-made glob-
ally coordinated clock time and Mercatorian map-space, such
that schoolchildren almost anywhere know “where” they are on
a stable world map and “what time it is” in a system that locates
every other place on that map this many hours ahead or behind.
II. Seriality and Census
In exactly the same year that Haji Misbach was campaigning for
a coordinated revolution in Oostenrijk and Java, the Nether-
lands East Indies government executed the first-ever scientific
census since the Dutch colonizing enterprise began more than
three centuries earlier. It too was, after a fashion, coordinating
and serializing, if in a radically different manner. To grasp the
difference, one needs to step back and consider briefly the global
history of the census, in the sense of a public counting of a
polity’s inhabitants. In these terms, the United States was the
pioneer with its rough and ready population count of 1790,
though France and the United Kingdom followed within a
decade. As the institution developed in the nineteenth century,
it combined two quite distinct projects. The first, which accounts
for America’s vanguard role, emerged from the logic of republi-
can institutions, the concept of the citizen, and the development
of suffrage. Fair and equal representation of citizens in national
legislatures required an accurate count of their numbers. Need-
less to say, for a long time, citizens did not include females, and,
in the United States at any rate, slaves. But the republican census
grammatically treated each citizen as an equal integer of various
Macalester International Vol. 4
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bounded series, which was what permitted their mathematical
aggregation for electoral purposes. This was the convention that
allowed Tocqueville to coin the phrase “tyranny of the major-
ity,” a concept unthinkable under the ancien régime.6 There is no
doubt that the spread of the census in the noncolonial world
went hand in hand with the rise of legislatures, the democratiza-
tion of political life, and the expansion of suffrage.
The second project emerged from new ideas for conscription
of soldiers and levying of taxes, combined with the interest of
early modern states in accumulating (mostly in secret) system-
atic information about their potential assets. This is how the
term statistics — derived from the German word for the State —
was coined in the second half of the eighteenth century by a
Cameralist economist at the University of Göttingen.7
One can see how in America after the 1850s these genealogies
combined in unexpected ways, as the census began carefully
counting women and children who could not vote, and, as the
huge tide of immigration from Europe swelled, also counting
persons who were not-quite, not-yet Americans and needed to
be mathematically segregated, for the purposes of policymak-
ing, in various ruling class-determined subseries: Italians, Poles,
Irish, Hungarians, and so on. Eventually, in the twentieth cen-
tury, the census would become a vast institutional complex
designed both to assure the foundations of democratic institu-
tions and to be the basis for every kind of macrosocial and
macroeconomic state planning. This meant that it became more
and more politically important how one was counted — along
what axes, within which series — since this seemed likely to
determine the costs and benefits accruing to each countee from
state policies. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
institution had become so “normalized” as a policy instrument
that it could move from the sphere of citizenship and elections
into the autocracies of the colonies in Asia and Africa with
instructive results, to which I will return.8
Three crucial features of the census helped shape the ways
people became accustomed to thinking about themselves. The
first was its rigorous anonymity. Person and personal names,
kin, ancestors, real everyday social ties were rigidly excluded by
its conventions. So, if one tries to find oneself in one’s nation’s
census, it will be with difficulty, and piecemeal, as digits in a
Benedict R. Anderson
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kaleidoscopic array of serial tabulations: salesperson, female,
Catholic, married, between 40 and 50, and so on. The second,
closely related feature was the impermissibility of fractions, or a
miragelike integrality of the body. For example, if census mak-
ers decided that a population was to be counted along the two
parallel series of Blacks and Whites, while the ambiguous reality
was that millions of countees were of mixed descent, then the
historical options practically available were: (1) arbitrary assign-
ment of countees to one series or the other, and (2) proliferation
of subcategories such as quadroon, mulatto, or, as is used today,
“mixed race,” whereby fractionality could reassume integral sta-
tus.9 But this integrality always turned out to be spectral because
the same person would also reappear — anonymously, piece-
meal—as an integer in dozens of other series. The third, perhaps
most important feature of all, was the convention of aggregabil-
ity on the basis of identity, which makes every series a bounded
one. One can count total medical doctors, total Armenians, and
total high-school graduates because the series stop at the state’s
edge.10 Meanwhile, just across the borders in Mexico and
Canada, the countings of identical aggregable doctors, Armeni-
ans, and high-school graduates begin again, but within a new
national n.
From a political point of view, and bearing in mind that the
census is a facet of governmentality, counted series necessarily
mean, in principle, series that “count,” in other words, series
that the state wishes to recognize, either on its own autocratic
planning account or in accordance with the dominant conven-
tions of the society over which it rules. If we observe that in
most censuses sex is handled in binary fashion so that everyone
is counted as either male or female while wealth is handled
scalar-fashion in a set of broad graduated steps, precise in the
middle range and opaque at the extremities so paupers and bil-
lionaires are decently obscured from view, we can assume a per-
vasive hegemonic ideology at work. It would be virtually
everywhere a revolutionary provocation to make gender scalar
(say, from 90 percent female down to 10 percent) and wealth
binary (so to say, Privileged Rich and Deprived Poor). There are
many other series of which the public is mostly unaware and
that have consequences only indirectly. But for reasons that we
will be looking at shortly, the series that tend to be most fraught
Macalester International Vol. 4
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are those that relate to exclusionary, quasi-ascriptive groupings:
religious, racial, and ethnic.
How much the question of counting counts and how various
the possibilities can be is nowhere better shown than in the two
important “Western” countries with a long history of naturaliz-
ing foreign immigrants: France and the United States (of the
two, France actually had proportionally higher immigration
rates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Until
now — though this is going to change in the next census — the
French state has refused to count “ethnics,” partly as a matter of
pride in francité and partly out of a fear of the divisiveness that
recognition could encourage.11 For decades this policy can be
said to have been very successful in that, except during Vichy,
there was no effective political mobilization along ethno-racial
lines. However, the huge immigrations in recent years from for-
mer French colonies in Northern and Western Africa have
aroused racist hostility. These racists demand that the immi-
grants be counted — for deportation. In reaction, immigrant
groups have pressured the government for “recognition;” they
and their France-born (and therefore citizen) children have
demanded to be counted explicitly as such. This development
has led many enlightened French observers to worry that their
country may be headed in the direction of America, where,
undoubtedly because of the country’s political origins in racial
slavery and near-extermination of the indigenous inhabitants,
ethno-racial categories have always “counted” and look as if
they will be counting more than ever in the future.
To grasp more fully the repercussions of the bounded serial-
ity that censuses introduced and consolidated, it is useful to
look beyond the industrial democracies of the turn of the cen-
tury. Colonial censuses, which developed as extensions of nor-
malized metropolitan practice, nonetheless were carried out by
autocratic bureaucracies, and thus, until very late, had no con-
nection with republican institutions and suffrage. The bureau-
crats themselves, originating in utterly different societies
thousands of miles away, rarely commanding local languages,
and often with very imperfect ideas about the cultures and of
the populations they governed, were usually guided by their
own cultures’ idées reçues, as well as amateurish anthropological
and historical studies. On the other side, for a good while, to the
Benedict R. Anderson
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colonized populations, who were accustomed to (evading) the
highly concrete prying of the taxman, the census remained
opaque. Hence a good deal of wild fantasy from above and
below.
An extreme, but amusing, illustration of this condition is pre-
sented by the successive inaugural censuses of 1911 and 1921 in
the remote Himalayan territory of Ladakh, on the outer perime-
ter of the British Raj. In 1911, groping young bureaucrats urged
people to fill in whatever “caste” they felt they belonged to (they
assumed that the Hindu institution of caste was a relevant cate-
gory in this predominantly Buddhist region). To their horror, in
a precomputer age, they found no less than “5,934 names
returned as principal castes, tribes, and races, etc., and 28,478 as
subcastes and minor divisions.” To prevent a repeat of this
avalanche, the bureaucracy drew up for the 1921 census its own
list of 54 castes, which were then entered on the census forms
and to which the Ladakhis were commanded to assign them-
selves.12 In much the same fashion, one finds comparable wild
fluctuations in the successive 1921 and 1931 censuses carried out
in British Burma, where the population of a bureaucratically
determined “Mon” minority increased by 81 percent in a decade
because the census makers changed some of the questions
asked.13
Such examples, which could be duplicated in dozens of
colonies, merely underline the governmental origins of the
bounded series. They do not show how, or in what ways,
bounded series had real identitarian consequences. We may rec-
ognize these consequences better if we consider briefly two par-
allel cases of very old neighboring colonies — the Netherlands
Indies and the Spanish (later American) Philippines, where the
census, late in the game, was superimposed on ancient political-
jural grids and categories.
The Indies censuses of 1921 and 1931 have, of course, the
usual colonial proliferation of unstable, often arbitrary “ethnic”
groups. What is much more striking, however, is that they show
(a) no persons of Eurasian ancestry, though European men had
been producing children with local women for more than 300
years; and (b) millions of people in the series “Chinese,” though
everyone knew that most of these people were of mixed descent,
knew no “Chinese” languages but used local vernaculars as
Macalester International Vol. 4
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their mother tongues, and had been resident in the Indies for
generations. The census counted such people, together with a
smaller group of recent “Chinese-speaking,” Confucian immi-
grants—with whom they could not communicate—as “Foreign
Orientals.”
These bizarreries did not come out of the blue, but stemmed
from decisions made in early colonial days not to permit mixed
ancestry a distinct legal status (if the White father recognized
the child — and there were social penalties for this — it became
European, otherwise it ended up as Native) and to compel peo-
ple whom the rulers decided were “Chinese” to live in ghettoes
policed by their “own” leaders, and with a distinct legal status.
The censuses thus reflected a long-standing juridically founded
mapping. The crucial innovation brought about by the public
census in this colony was to produce a politico-sociology out of
a maze of administrative regulations. The invisibility of
Eurasians in the fine-grained, minutely differentiated “ethnic”
portrait of the colony showed that by not being counted, they
did not count and they had no role to play as such; only masked,
so to speak, would they show up, anonymously, as fictive
Whites or fictive Natives. Although there is plenty of evidence
that the present national culture of Indonesia has important
roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Eurasian communi-
ties, almost no Indonesians are aware of this.14 And after a hard-
fought independence came in 1949, “white” Eurasians mostly
slipped quietly away to California and the Netherlands, while
the “native” ones disappeared into various ethnic groups or sur-
vived in the marginal roles of small-time gangsters, nightclub
singers, call girls, and movie starlets.
The colony was also now publicly on view as containing sev-
eral million “Chinese foreigners,” a numerated, trans-insular
“minority” group that “counted,” but only in an ambiguous
sense. (Note that the White rulers, who included themselves
also as a “minority” in their own census, did not appear as “For-
eign Occidentals.”) It is no surprise, then, that popular anti-Chi-
nese pogroms became a regular feature of colonial life from that
census-time on and have persisted in the postcolonial era.
Although the censuses after independence abolished ethnic cat-
egories à la française, in today’s parlance a WNI (warga negara
Benedict R. Anderson
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Indonesia, “citizen of Indonesia”) always and only means a “Chi-
nese,” i.e., a residual “Foreign Oriental.”
In the Philippines, the Spanish rulers had for centuries pur-
sued “category” policies diametrically opposed to those of the
Dutch. From the start, people of mixed ancestry were given their
own jural status, in the classical Iberian colonial manner, as mes-
tizos, below the Peninsulars and Creoles but above the Indios.
Their numbers grew enormously over the years as they married
among themselves and drew in newer products of sexual inter-
course between Spaniards, “Chinese,” and “Natives.” On the
other hand, with conversion to Catholicism as one core aspect of
the colonial project, Madrid tried, with great success, to make it
juridically impossible for a male “Chinese” immigrant to have
“Chinese” children. Women from southeastern China did not
migrate to the Philippines until late in the nineteenth century,
and all marriages had to be performed by Catholic rites. To have
families at all, immigrants had to marry local women, and by
law all their children were classified as mixed, “not-Chinese,” so
to speak. Thus, in the only census the Spanish managed success-
fully, one finds almost the exact opposite of the formal sociology
of the Netherlands Indies: a large number of “mixed,” and a
small number of “Chinese,” who were genuinely Hokkien- or
Cantonese-speaking immigrants. We should not be surprised to
find therefore that with this census-truth the modern Philip-
pines has no history of racial pogroms, and that its ruling class is
overwhelmingly mestizo.
There is one aspect of the censuses in these two colonies that
deserves our special attention: the novelty of ethnicity.15 The
basic grids for both Spanish and Dutch were juridical, not
anthropological. “Ethnicity” as such is simply invisible in the
Spanish census, and when it showed up in the Indies in 1921,
just two decades before the collapse of the Dutch Empire, it had
a rather fanciful character, precisely because the vast colony had
not been juridically organized along “ethnic” lines. But it was a
powerful beginning: for the first time in history, the census
brought to the public imagination the existence of x million
“identical” Balinese, y million “identical” Javanese, and z mil-
lion “identical” Acehnese, as well as “totals” that turned these
millions into percentages and majorities or minorities.
Macalester International Vol. 4
14
04/15/97  12:23 PM      0901and3.qxd
It was the Americans who brought ethnicity to the Philip-
pines, and in spades. Even as they brutally suppressed the
Philippine revolution and imposed their own imperium, they
set about creating a census-portrait of their new acquisition
along Washingtonian lines. Quite suddenly, the social map of
the colony was transformed. The 1903 census produced new
races by color, inter alia: White, which included Arabs; Yellow,
which included Siamese; and Black, which merged Afro-Ameri-
can soldiers with the tiny ancient Negrito populations of the
islands’ mountainous interiors. Furthermore, dozens of real and
bogus ethnolinguistic groupings were counted — in alphabeti-
cal, telephone-book order — as either “civilized” or “wild.” It
was now possible for ordinary speakers of Tagalog or Cebuano
to think of themselves as “counting”: “There are x million of
‘us,’ and we amount to y percentage of the population.” Out of
this was born a conflict that is still with us today over the politi-
cal status of these languages. (Fortunately, the Americans’ rule,
lasting barely four decades, did not last long enough to deeply
institutionalize, juridically or administratively, most of their
weirder fantasies.)
It can be safely said that everywhere in the colonial world, the
effect of the censuses and the institutions that barnacled them-
selves to them had the effect of initiating a transformation of
people’s imaginations along potentially political lines: there was
a new way of counting by being counted; one could conceive of
oneself as “a” Sikh or “a” Somali among “exactly” so many mil-
lions of “identical” Sikhs and Somalis whom the state had
authoritatively counted. What made these “exactnesses” possi-
ble was the fact that these series were bounded by the reach of
the state. (Javanese outside the Indies did not count and were
not counted.) And in this way, even in the colonial autocracies,
people were gradually being prepared from on high for a
majoritarian-minoritarian politics of ethnicity and ethnicized
religious affiliation when the time for independence and repub-
lican institutions would arrive.16
We can now turn to some wider political implications of the
two serialities I have been describing — one, born in society,
unbounded, and unenumerated; the other, born in the state,
bounded, and numerated — as the world has changed its shape
in the course of this dying century.
Benedict R. Anderson
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III. Unbounded Series
The figure of Haji Misbach is emblematic. The world-turned-
upside-down in which he came to young maturity made it pos-
sible for him to enter, locally, every kind of unbound series: he
would become “a” communist, joining unnumbered other com-
munists all over the world working for the Revolution; he
would become “an” anticolonial agitator in a transgenerational
world series that included Mahatma Gandhi and Thomas Jeffer-
son, Sun Yat-sen and Giuseppe Garibaldi; he would become “a”
political prisoner, “a” newspaper editor, “a” Muslim preacher,
“a” businessman, and so on. In every case, to enter the series
meant that he had to “act” in both senses of the word. He could
be an agitator only if he agitated; and he would have to learn
how to “play” agitator, which he would do partly from his read-
ing of the newspapers and partly from practical experience.
Which series he entered were always in principle provisional: he
might one day become “a” Christian, “a” reactionary, “a” musi-
cian, “a” nationalist, “an” assassin. And he would have to accept
that he might have to pay for his ticket of entry and that a cer-
tain kind of responsibility inhered with each series.
This kind of seriality has lost none of its importance in our
own times. If we decide to be “an” environmentalist, “a” femi-
nist, “a” human rights activist, “a” conservative, “a” translator,
“a” zoologist, “a” football fan, and so on, we are following in
Misbach’s steps. In no instance are we, before we start, entitled
to anything, and in every case, we have to pay our dues. We
cannot become any of the above without “acting” the part out,
and we recognize that the acting is, if locally based, quotidianly
universal. It is indeed exactly this universalism that made the
rise of unbound seriality such a powerful force for human
emancipation over the past two centuries: the series in Mis-
bach’s head were among the things that gave him courage to try
to subvert the powerful long-standing White regime that con-
trolled his society. This is also why nationalists understood
themselves as belonging to an honorable unbound series that
included, provisionally at least, George Washington, Kwame
Nkrumah, Ernest Bevin, Ho Chi Minh, and, by a fanciful retro-
historical movement, Jeanne d’Arc, Ch’in Shi Huang-ti,
Boadicea, and so many others. This is also why it was possible
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for the Italian nationalist Mazzini to be regarded as the father of
the League of Nations and why the United Nations today seems
so normal, so absolutely unoxymoronic. Finally, it is also why,
in spite of the ever-tightening integration of the world capitalist
economy, the number of new and smaller nations entering the
UN continues to increase. (As Misbach said, “Brothers, remem-
ber! The land belongs to no one other than ourselves.”) The
series “nations” is unbounded and innumerate.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to fail to notice the melan-
choly aspects of the rise of unbounded seriality. To illustrate the
point, I would like here to turn to Vietnam. The nineteenth-cen-
tury French colonial conquest of Vietnam was not a pleasant
business, but, as one looks back, one is struck by the smallness
of the military and bureaucratic apparatuses employed and by
the modesty of the atrocities committed—certainly by compari-
son with the vast, savage eight-year war that in the 1940s and
1950s brought French imperialism there to its downfall. One
also notes that in those early days almost no Frenchman under-
stood any Vietnamese, knew any Vietnamese history, or appre-
ciated the complexity of Vietnamese cultures. Conversely, only
a small group of converted Catholic Vietnamese knew any
French, and the dynasty in Hué was almost entirely enclosed
within its local Confucian consciousness. The men of Hué and
Paris, then, genuinely came from two utterly different civiliza-
tions that scarcely comprehended one another. It is certain that
serial habits of mind did not yet substantially exist in Viet-
namese ruling circles. Did they even think of their adversaries as
belonging to an abstract series “French”?17
By the early twentieth century, however, unbounded seriality
had become normalized, at least in urban colonial Vietnam —
which was a new world filled with clocks, newspapers, atlases,
secret police, railway stations, liberty-equality-fraternity, anar-
chism, interest rates, standardized school curricula, homosexu-
ality, and gramophones. And, of course, Marxism. So it did not
seem peculiar for Ho Chi Minh to travel thousands of miles to
Paris, to work there, and to join that radical wing of the French
Socialist Party that became the French Communist Party. (Nor
did it seem odd for the PCF to admit him.) Both in France and
Vietnam people were becoming aware of playing “universal”
roles in a world much bigger than either. Hence, by the mid-
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1940s French and Vietnamese leaders understood each other
almost perfectly, in absolute contrast to the situation only sev-
enty years earlier.
They recognized each other serially too, as “communists,”
“imperialists,” “nationalists,” and “reactionaries,” and these cat-
egories were not at all aligned with their respective states. There
were common serialities linking “reactionaries” in Vietnam and
France — “left-wingers” too. They used much the same maps,
guns, educational structures, diplomatic procedures, military
tactics, and so on. This is why, from a certain point of view, one
can think of the duration and savagery of the Franco-Viet-
namese War of 1945–54 as characteristic of a civil war.
One could even go so far as to see the Vietnam-American War
(1965 – 75) from the same angle: as an unbelievably brutal civil
war, marked by Washington dropping a higher tonnage of high
explosive bombs on tiny Vietnam than it had done on Nazi Ger-
many and its continental allies. From the start, the Vietnamese
leaders knew that ultimately this war, like civil wars generally,
could only be won politically; and in the end the American lead-
ers themselves decided that they had been defeated, not militar-
ily but merely “politically.”18 A political victory for Ho Chi Minh
and his associates had two aspects—one domestic, one external.
With the first—developing the committed support among large
sections of the population that would enable nation and state to
survive three million killed by the Americans — we are not here
primarily concerned. The second, however, is very relevant. The
leaders in Hanoi understood their adversaries extremely well,
and it was just for this reason that they were positioned to, as
the hostile phrase goes, “manipulate” public opinion in the
United States and in dozens of countries around the world. And
the discourse of this “manipulation” was cousinly, not Confu-
cian: We want our independence, just like you and every other
nation. Uncle Ho is our George Washington. We both agreed to
free elections throughout Vietnam in the Geneva Convention,
but you prevented them and created a puppet state instead. We,
like hundreds of millions around the globe, are resisting West-
ern imperialism.
In the aftermath of defeat, there was a great deal of hand-
wringing among American policymakers and academics about
American ignorance of Vietnamese language, culture, and his-
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tory, as if to say had we been less ignorant, we would have pre-
vailed. Robert McNamara’s fairly recent apologia pro sua vita con-
tinues to sound this theme. But in a basic respect this
handwringing is beside the point. By 1946, the French had an
incomparably better knowledge of Vietnamese culture, history,
and language than they had had in 1860, and it did them not a
bit of good. What Washington “did not understand” was not
something ancient, Asian, and alien, but something perfectly
modern: a Vietnamese nationalism that in its fundamental
grammar was aligned with American nationalism. This may be
why out of this war came a post-civil war language of “healing,”
alongside that of revenge, and why visits to Vietnam by Ameri-
can veterans can have the aura of visits by Southerners to Get-
tysburg.
A similar argument could be made in cases much less contro-
versially described as civil wars. Abuse of the “Mayan” popula-
tions of Guatemala has a long, grim history going back to the
earliest days of the Spanish colonial presence. Nonetheless, after
1954, when the C.I.A. engineered the toppling of the Arbenz
regime, there was an unprecedented and sustained increase in
the scale and cruelty of the horrors committed in Guatemala. No
doubt, the military and police now have more technically
advanced means of committing mass atrocities than they once
did. But the increase in abuse also derives from evolving condi-
tions in which Mayans and Ladinos have become more and
more alike, serially aligned in Misbach fashion — that is, at the
point when Mayans find it normal to wear wristwatches, listen
to the radio, read magazines, “organize,” develop relations with
agencies outside Guatemala, and so on, exactly the conditions
under which colonial war has given way to genuine civil war.
We can also be fairly sure that if the Mayans were successful in
taking power, Guatemala would stay Guatemala — even with a
Burkina Faso-style name change. It would have its place in the
UN, flourish a national flag, sing a national anthem, and have a
president, an immigration service, a standardized school sys-
tem, and a (hopefully not secret) police.
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IV. Bounded Series
As noted earlier, the origins of the bounded, numerable series
lay in the census and suffrage. Outside the colonial world these
two “parents” were normally copresent and were connected
and subordinated to the great nineteenth-century conception of
citizenship. The Norwegian census counted as “Norwegians”
only those who were legally citizens of Norway and did not
bother its head about “Norwegians” in Alberta or North Dakota.
Similarly, if the Canadian census decided to count “Norwe-
gians,” it focused on those who were citizens of Canada. The
series was strictly bounded by the state. Viewed from this angle,
it is clear that “ethnicity” was always parasitic on the nation. To
be “ethnic” required a prior entitlement as a national; to partici-
pate politically as an ethnic one had to have the right to partici-
pate as a citizen of something nonethnic. And one’s entitlements
— especially after the onset of the age of the welfare-develop-
mental state—always originated in this national-citizenship.
Nothing indicates this more clearly than the strange business
of voting. It is hard to think of a more minimal kind of political
act. On a given day, one joins a line of people taking turns to
enter a particular closed space (ideally as private as a public toi-
let), pulls the same levers or fills in the same ballots as everyone
else, and then leaves. As in the census, the voter appears as an
anonymous, unfractioned member of a bounded series so that
her vote ends up as simply another digit in the accumulation of
different totals. At the time of casting her ballot, she can, for the
moment, be thought of as “a” voter in the same way as one
might be “a” strikebreaker or “a” socialist, but in the long rest-
of-the-time she simply has an ascribed status as a person enti-
tled to vote, even if she never again makes use of this title.
Furthermore, under normal circumstances, as a young person
growing up in a particular nation-state, she has “automatically”
acquired this status, without paying any visible dues. It is here,
in the quasi-ascriptive status that accrues from the bounded,
numerated citizen-voter series, that we find the grammatical
basis for a politics that at first sight seems almost the opposite of
Misbach’s, one that seems headed for dangerous exclusionisms.
But this kind of conclusion should not be reached too hastily.
In the heyday of the classical nation-state — between, say, 1840
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and 1940 — there was a clear idea that along with the ascriptive
entitlements of citizenship came no less clear responsibilities. As
a citizen, one was morally obliged to obey the law, pay taxes
without too much fuss, serve in the army if a young male, honor
national emblems and offices, and so forth. In a more general
sense, one was to assume civic responsibility for the practices of
the national community of one’s bounded fellow-citizenry. One
can still find very clear and impressive traces of this conception
in the outlook of some participants in the antiwar movement in
the 1960s and 1970s, who went so far as to break the law in order
not to be ashamed of their country or to stop their country from
doing something they saw as wicked. They were both entitled,
and morally obliged, to act.
It was out of this frame of thinking that the shaping of the first
“new world order” emerged with the founding of the League of
Nations. Woodrow Wilson’s proposals for redrawing the
boundaries of states in Europe was guided by just this idea: a
Polish nation-state must come into being that would, should
encompass those populations committed to being citizens of
Poland — with the reasonable likelihood that most, but not nec-
essarily all, of these would be Polish-speakers and Polish-read-
ers. Somewhat later the same logic applied to the
extra-European possessions in their movement toward indepen-
dence, since colonial rule made any modern form of civic
responsibility unlikely or even impossible. The significance of
this should not be lost even in today’s very different conditions
of life. It is not difficult for Amnesty International to recruit
activists and helpers among the politically stateless or among
refugees who have acquired another citizenship; what is much
more difficult, and much more important, is to recruit resident
citizens of countries with brutal regimes just because of their
ascriptive entitlement to act there politically.
On the other hand, there are two aspects of the bounded
series that have clearly ominous implications. First of all, it has
proved only too easy to slide the ascriptive status of national-cit-
izen onto subnational bounded series — ethnic, religious, racial,
and so forth — thus encouraging unamiable identitarian politics
within the national-state. These slides, precisely because they
operate in a majoritarian-minoritarian matrix, often have a paro-
dic character, so to speak — plenty of entitlement, little account-
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ability.19 They also reveal another kind of malformation. We
have seen how the census matches up nicely with suffrage. The
commonality of voters lies strictly in their belonging to the
juridical series “citizens,” who indeed from the “suffrage point
of view” can be genuinely seen as “identical.” (This is one rea-
son to think that the moment when a self-imagined ethnic group
decides to reimagine itself as a nation can have its hopeful
aspects.)20 This “identity” is also external and formal. But ethnic
identities, like religious and gender identities, typically appear
to their bearers as immanent and pervasive, located, so to speak,
at the site where the soul once generally resided. Precisely for
this reason, their serial alignment and aggregation tends to
require a substantial measure of physical and psychological
coercion: who is a citizen is normally a straightforward matter
of law, but who is a Hispanic is anything but. Notice now the
simple contrast with membership in unbounded series, where,
as I suggested earlier, one has to “act” in order to make it plausi-
ble to reproach a comrade in these terms: “You say you are an
anarchist, so show me by what you do.” In the bounded series,
on the other hand, the typical reproach is: “We say you are a
Hispanic, a gay, or a Chechen, whether you like it or not, so you
had better live by what we know you are.”
The second rather melancholy implication of bounded serial-
ity has its origins in the increasing and worldwide breakdown
of nineteenth-century and Wilsonian assumptions. One can see
this slow breakdown along two dimensions. The first concerns
the real capacities of the classical nation-state and the obliga-
tions on which it was based.21 The sovereign nation was sup-
posed to be able to defend itself militarily on the basis of mass
conscription of male citizens; and it was supposed to have an
“economy” of its own, defended by its own currency, central
bank, tariff system, and so on, which is why the word national-
ization became the normal term for state expropriation of foreign
businesses, or intolerable domestic monopolies, in the name of
the nation. Confidence in a genuine “national economy” under-
girded a substantial part of domestic political conflict over social
and economic policy, and it also made the payment of taxes a
good deal easier to endure. But the onward march of military
technology has made the conscript army largely obsolete, while
control over movements of financial capital to a substantial
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degree escapes all governments of nation-states. One could add
further that the institutional power of organized special interests
and the impact of television has been making the vote appear
less valuable (maybe especially in the United States, where voter
participation has been declining for decades).22
A key assumption behind Wilson’s view that a Poland should
be created to house Poles was that populations would not sub-
stantially move. In the new Poland, Poles would be born, work,
marry, act as citizens, and be buried on their now-native soil.
This assumption was perhaps even in Wilson’s day not very
well grounded. But since then, especially in the past three
decades, the rise of rapid, safe, and relatively cheap global trans-
portation has made possible a scale of migration unimaginable
in earlier epochs. (Typically, but by no means exclusively, it is
migration from poor and violence-ridden countries to the better-
padded industrial democracies.) Furthermore, such migrations
no longer need to be once-and-for-all. The Filipino maid effec-
tively domiciled in Rome can make enough money to “holiday”
in the Philippines every year, and perhaps she will eventually
retire there. At the same time, modern communications technol-
ogy makes it far more feasible than it once was for migrants to
“keep in touch,” practically and psychologically. The telephone,
electronic banking, videotapes, radio, and television, to say
nothing of e-mail, are making a sort of “virtual,” portable
nationality more and more possible, and, exactly because of peo-
ple’s nomadic experience, more and more attractive. The impli-
cation is a widening split between citizenship and affective
nationality.23
There is of course an old history of nationalist political
activism on the part of “overseas” communities. Early Greek
nationalism got its start outside the Ottoman Empire in Odessa
and Vienna. Sun Yat-sen built his nationalist organization to a
substantial degree on Chinese communities in different parts of
the world outside China. But in most cases, these overseas
groups saw themselves in a supportive, not a leading, role; as
genuine political exiles, they hoped that when the repressive
regimes they opposed collapsed, they would be able to go home.
Things are rather different these days, when it has proved possi-
ble for American citizen Milan Panic´ to serve as the prime minis-
ter of Yugoslavia, and Canadian citizen Goyko Šušak to become
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Croatia’s minister of defense (i.e., war). The latter case is espe-
cially instructive, since Šušak, a successful Ottawa-based pizza
millionaire who built a huge, right-wing North American net-
work of “overseas” Croatians, used the ample funds at his dis-
posal to win Croatia’s presidential elections for Franjo Tudjman,
and then get the (war) ministry as his personal reward.24 His
extensive North American political and military contacts also
made him a key player in the buildup of the Croatian military.
Networks of this general type have proved crucial to the victory
of the Armenians over the Azeris25 and the violent struggle of
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.26
In such cases, which are likely to increase in the future, we
can detect a mutation in the bounded seriality I described ear-
lier. They are producing, shall we say, “private” censuses, which
try carefully to count what they conceive of under the stately
name of diasporas — 6,500,000 “Jews” in the United States,
1,500,000 “Indians” in the United Kingdom, 500,000 “Greeks” in
Australia.27 These are bounded series, but they are globally
bound by private enterprise and not attached in any way to citi-
zenship or suffrage. The politics that tend to emerge are not
linked to democratic institutions or traditional accountability.
They thrive on the secretive narcissism of e-mail nets and lend
themselves to violence and paranoid fantasies. It is not at all sur-
prising that people active in these networks are often “disap-
pointed” by those in their series who actually live in, say,
Armenia, the Punjab, Ireland, or Croatia, whom they find too
soft, too impure, too contaminated by “foreign” cultures. There
is plenty to worry about when ethnicity escapes the nation, and
the bounded series the state.
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